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Political Orientation of Government and 
Stock Market Returns 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Prior research documented that U.S. stock prices tend to grow faster during 
Democratic than during Republican administrations. This letter examines whether 
stock returns in other countries also depend on the political orientation of the 
incumbents. An analysis of 24 stock markets and 173 governments reveals that there 
are no statistically significant differences in returns between left-wing and right-wing 
executives. Consequently, international investment strategies based on the political 
orientation of countries’ leadership are likely to be futile. 
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I. Introduction 
An important question faced by every voter on the Election Day is which of 
the parties is best equipped to foster the development of economy and capital 
markets. In the pursuit of their own political agenda, the winning party or coalition 
can fine-tune the fiscal policy and significantly impact on the future economic 
outcomes. Depending on their political orientation, the objectives of different camps 
can be quite disparate. As suggested by the partisan theory of Hibbs (1977), left-wing 
governments tend to cater for the well-being of their working class electorate by 
targeting unemployment. Right-wing governments, on the other hand, prioritize 
reduction in inflation so feared by the higher income and occupational status groups.  
Several earlier papers focused specifically on the relationship between 
political orientation of the executive branch of the government and stock market 
performance. Johnson et al. (1999) and Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) report that 
U.S. stock market returns were higher under Democratic than Republican 
presidencies, with the difference being particularly large for small stock portfolios. 
This anomaly can not be explained away by variations in business cycle proxies. 
Huang (1985) and Hensel and Ziemba (1995) look at whether presidential trading 
strategies are able to improve investors’ risk-return trade-off. 
 Our paper adds to the presidential puzzle literature by extending the empirical 
analysis beyond the U.S. stock market. The data set compiled for this study covers 24 
OECD countries and 173 governments. Since elections are relatively infrequent, a 
multi-country approach allows increasing the number of observations and the power 
of statistical tests. Furthermore, it provides useful insights to international investors 
who wonder whether the conclusions obtained from the U.S. data can be generalized 
in a global context. 
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The remainder of this letter is organized as follows. The next section 
describes data sources and sample characteristics. Section III investigates the 
behavior of stock market indices around the Election Day and throughout the tenure 
of different administrations. The implications for investors and conclusions are 
contained in the last section. 
 
II. Data 
 In order to investigate the nexus between political variables and stock returns, 
the authors attempted to construct a comprehensive data set including all OECD 
countries. Regrettably, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Slovakia, South Korea, and 
Switzerland had to be excluded from the analysis because either MSCI did not 
provide data on stock market indices for these capital markets, or there was not a 
single change in the orientation of the government throughout the period for which 
the index was available. The returns for the remaining 24 countries were computed 
using the U.S. dollar denominated, value-weighted, and dividend-adjusted MSCI 
Country Indices spanning a period from January 1980 through December 2005. 
Whenever daily data on MSCI indices was not available from January 1980, the 
sample period was adjusted accordingly. The stock market data was sourced from 
Thomson Financial Datastream. 
The prevailing political system in a given country (presidential or 
parliamentary) determines the relevant type of election that will be examined. 
Election dates as well as the exact start and end dates of each government’s term in 
office were obtained from Banks et al. (2004), Caramani (2000), Lane et al. (1991), 
Laver and Schofield (1998), and Müller and Strøm (2000). The classification of 
governments into left- and right-leaning administrations was taken from Alesina and 
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Roubini (1992), Alt (1985), and Banks et al. (2004). Coalition governments were 
attributed to the political camp they are conventionally associated with. Table 1 
describes the characteristics of the political and financial variables used in this letter.  
[Table 1 about here] 
Over 60% of the countries had daily MSCI index data available from January 
1980, whereas in the remaining cases the index starts at a later date. Among the 24 
nations, Denmark and Australia had the highest number of governments included and 
Greece had the lowest. The data set covers a comparable number of 85 left-wing and 
88 right-wing governments. Although the number of right-wing cabinets was slightly 
higher, the left-wing governments had tenures that were on average 70 days longer. 
This translates into longer overall term in office for the left camp. 
 
III. Results 
Abnormal Returns around the Election Day  
 One of the features of political systems is that elections do not necessarily 
coincide with an immediate change in the executive. For instance, the U.S. elections 
are always held on Tuesday following the first Monday of November, whereas the 
presidential term starts on the 20th of January the following year. This study 
investigates the relationship between politics and stock markets by focusing both on 
the entire term of office and on the day on which voters cast their ballots.   
It is conceivable that in the face of political changes investors adjust their 
required risk premium on assets. If they attribute greater uncertainty to the left of the 
political scene, the stock market will be expected to offer higher returns under left-
wing incumbencies. The higher returns would be a form of compensation for the 
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increased risk. In this scenario, however, the prices on the Election Day are likely to 
plummet. This is an immediate consequence of the increased discount rate and the 
resultant lower present value of future cash flows of all firms. The story of changing 
risk premia is consistent with the previously discussed presidential puzzle and Riley 
and Luksetich (1980) findings showing the existence of negative returns around the 
Election Day for Democratic victories and positive returns for Republican wins. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
In its first step, this analysis examines international stock market patterns 
around the Election Day using a simple event study. The abnormal returns are 
defined as difference between the returns on the respective MSCI Country Index and 
the MSCI World Index. Figure 1 depicts the cumulative abnormal returns separated 
by orientation of the election winner. The plots show no apparent market reaction 
around the day when the uncertainty about future political leadership is resolved. The 
cumulative abnormal returns for the right-wing and left-wing election winners 
oscillate within a narrow range and fail to reach statistical significance. 
Consequently, the conclusion that investors re-adjust their discount rates in response 
to election results is not supported in our data. It is also unlikely that highly 
profitable trading strategies based on the predictions of election outcomes can be 
designed.  
Returns during the Term of Office 
 Having established that the announcement effect around elections is 
negligible, our focus turns to measuring stock market performance throughout 
different incumbencies. Table 2 presents the dollar-denominated annualized returns 
corresponding to calendar years of tenure. The second column shows mean returns 
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under left-wing rules and is juxtaposed with the third column which reports similar 
statistics for the right-wing governments. A bootstrap test based on 1,000 replications 
is used to verify whether the difference between these two columns is equal to zero.  
[Table 2 about here] 
 According to Table 2, the Democrat premium in the U.S. is around 7.7% per 
annum, which is in line with the findings of previous studies using value-weighted 
indices (see Huang (1985), Johnson et al. (1999), and Santa-Clara and Valkanov 
(2003)). The U.S. experience does not, however, generalize in the global context. A 
closer inspection reveals that 14 out of the 24 considered stock markets actually 
offered a right-wing government premium. Out of the five cases with bootstrap p-
value below 10%, two favored right-wing governments and three favored the 
political left. Overall, the stock market returns were 34 basis points higher when the 
left-wing cabinets were in power, but this result is not statistically significant. In light 
of these findings, international investors should exercise a great deal of caution 
whenever speculating on the orientation of the executive. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
Several earlier papers noted that U.S. stock prices tend to grow faster when 
Democrats are in office. This anomaly persisted for almost a century and 
opportunities to exploit it in security trading were present. Since political orientation 
of the incumbent president is common knowledge, this result may prima facie appear 
as a violation of the Efficient Market Hypothesis. Alternatively, it may be interpreted 
as an increased risk premium accruing to investors who decide to hold stocks 
throughout the tenure of left-wing administrations. If the latter explanation was 
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correct, one would expect high returns during left-wing rules not only in the U.S., but 
also in other countries.  
To verify the above-mentioned hypothesis, this study used a comprehensive 
database covering 24 OECD countries and 173 governments. The results based on 
the international sample indicate that there are no statistically significant differences 
in returns between left-wing and right-wing governments neither in the election 
period nor throughout the tenure. The anomaly observed in the U.S. appears to be 
country-specific and investors who diversify their portfolios internationally should be 
wary of allocating their money based solely on the political orientation of the 
countries’ leadership.  
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Figure 1: 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns around the Election Day 
 
Note: This figure depicts cumulative abnormal returns around the Election Day (Day 0) for right-wing 
and left-wing government wins. In instances where elections took place during the weekend, Day 0 is 
defined as the first day of trading after the elections. Abnormal returns are calculated as the difference 
between the return on the respective MSCI Country Index and the MSCI World Index. They are 
subsequently averaged across all relevant events and cumulated over time to obtain the cumulative 
abnormal return.  
 10
Table 1: 
Sample Description 
Country MSCI index starting date 
Number of 
left-wing 
governments 
Number of 
right-wing 
governments 
Number of days 
left-wing 
government  
in office 
Number of days 
right-wing 
government  
in office 
Australia 1-Jan-80 5 6 4,749 4,382 
Austria 1-Jan-80 6 2 7,339 1,792 
Belgium 1-Jan-80 2 6 1,999 7,132 
Canada 1-Jan-80 5 3 5,734 3,397 
Czech Republic 30-Dec-94 2 2 2,359 1,295 
Denmark 1-Jan-80 5 6 4,211 4,920 
Finland 1-Jan-87 5 1 5,126 1,448 
France 1-Jan-80 4 4 5,346 3,785 
Germany 1-Jan-80 4 5 3,261 5,870 
Greece 1-Jun-01 1 1 1,013 296 
Hungary 2-Jan-95 2 1 2,230 1,421 
Italy 1-Jan-80 6 3 7,487 1,644 
Japan 2-Jan-80 1 9 885 8,245 
Mexico 1-Jan-88 3 1 4,718 1,491 
Netherlands 1-Jan-80 2 7 2,891 6,240 
New Zealand 2-Jan-87 4 3 3,248 3,325 
Norway 1-Jan-80 5 5 5,029 4,102 
Poland 1-Jan-93 2 2 2,635 1,747 
Portugal 4-Jan-88 2 3 2,350 3,856 
Spain 1-Jan-80 5 3 5,161 3,970 
Sweden 1-Jan-80 6 2 7,021 2,110 
Turkey 4-Jan-88 2 4 1,407 4,799 
United Kingdom 1-Jan-80 3 4 2,800 6,331 
United States 1-Jan-80 3 5 3,307 5,824 
Overall         85         88        92,306          89,422 
Note: The first column lists all of the 24 OECD countries included in the sample. The dates from which daily 
stock prices for the respective MSCI Country Indices became available in Datastream are shown in the second 
column. For any given country, the number of left-wing and right-wing governments that were in office 
between the index start date and the end of 2005 are indicated, as well as the overall number of days 
corresponding to the tenures of either political camp.  
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Table 2: 
Political Orientation of Government and Stock Market Returns 
Returns [%] 
Country Left- 
Wing 
Right- 
Wing Difference 
Bootstrap 
p-value 
Australia 11.0897   2.0911    8.9986 0.1140 
Austria   4.5204 19.4968 -14.9764 0.0490** 
Belgium   2.3024   9.8324   -7.5300 0.2060 
Canada   5.6661   7.7861   -2.1200 0.3680 
Czech Republic 18.1543  -3.9685  22.1228 0.0730* 
Denmark  -0.8029 13.3258 -14.1287 0.1090 
Finland   9.9560 12.9370   -2.9810 0.4440 
France 13.4530   1.5492  11.9038 0.0690* 
Germany  -4.1297 14.1892 -18.3189 0.0160** 
Greece   3.1633 31.0425 -27.8792 0.1480 
Hungary 33.4150  -5.9310  39.3460 0.0190** 
Italy 10.9697   2.9079    8.0618 0.2260 
Japan   0.4352   7.9392   -7.5041 0.2690 
Mexico 20.1139 13.8611    6.2528 0.3610 
Netherlands   4.9962 11.1087   -6.1125 0.2330 
New Zealand  -3.9651   3.0679   -7.0330 0.2460 
Norway   3.3169   9.9913   -6.6744 0.2020 
Poland   8.0489 28.1800 -20.1311 0.1690 
Portugal   4.5779   0.3350    4.2429 0.3320 
Spain 12.4139   3.0942    9.3197 0.1270 
Sweden 15.0895   9.7092    5.3803 0.3030 
Turkey   0.9501   8.2212   -7.2711 0.3670 
United Kingdom   3.1467 10.6031   -7.4564 0.1490 
United States 13.9556   6.2568    7.6988 0.1230 
Overall   8.6992   8.3588    0.3404 0.5580 
Note: The first column lists all of the 24 countries included in our sample. The next two 
columns report annualized dollar-denominated average stock market returns during the 
tenure of left-wing and right-wing governments. Column 4 shows the difference 
between the two estimates. The last column lists the bootstrap p-values for the null 
hypotheses that the differences in column 4 equal zero. The bootstrap procedure was 
performed as follows. For a single bootstrap, sample returns were drawn at random with 
replacement to match the number of days in office for the left-wing and right-wing 
governments in our original sample. Subsequently, the annualized average returns for 
both camps were computed and the difference was recorded. This procedure was 
repeated 1,000 times to develop an empirical distribution for the difference under the 
null and the p-value was extracted from this distribution.  
